Assume that two distant parties, Alice and Bob, as well as an adversary, Eve, have access to (quantum) systems prepared jointly according to a tripartite state ρABE. In addition, Alice and Bob can use local operations and authenticated public classical communication. Their goal is to establish a key which is unknown to Eve. We initiate the study of this scenario as a unification of two standard scenarios: (i) key distillation (agreement) from classical correlations and (ii) key distillation from pure tripartite quantum states.
Introduction
Many cryptographic tasks such as message encryption or authentication rely on secret keys, 1 i.e., random strings only known to a restricted set of parties. In information-theoretic cryptography, where no assumptions on the adversary's resources 2 are made, distributing keys between distant parties is impossible if only public classical communication channels are available [1, 2] . However, this situation changes dramatically if the parties have access to additional devices such as noisy channels (where also a wiretapper is subject to noise), a noisy source of randomness, a quantum channel, or a pre-shared quantum state. As shown in [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] , these devices allow the secure distribution of keys.
3
This work is concerned with information-theoretic key distillation from pre-distributed noisy data. More precisely, we consider a situation where two distant parties, Alice and Bob, have access to (not necessarily perfectly) correlated pieces of (classical or quantum) information, which might be partially known to an adversary, Eve. The goal of Alice and Bob is to distill virtually perfect key bits from these data, using only an authentic (but otherwise insecure) classical communication channel.
Generally speaking, key distillation is possible whenever Alice and Bob's data are sufficiently correlated and, at the same time, Eve's uncertainty on these data is sufficiently large. It is one of the goals of this paper to exhibit the properties pre-shared data must have in order to allow key distillation.
In practical applications, the pre-distributed data might be obtained from realistic physical devices such as noisy (classical or quantum) channels or other sources of randomness. Eve's uncertainty on Alice and Bob's data might then be imposed by inevitable noise in the devices due to thermodynamic or quantum effects.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be seen as a special case of key distillation where the pre-shared data is generated using a quantum channel. The laws of quantum physics imply that the random values held by one party, say Alice, cannot at the same time be correlated with Bob and Eve. Hence, whenever Alice and Bob's values are strongly correlated (which can be checked easily) then Eve's uncertainty about them must inevitably (by the laws of quantum mechanics) be large, hence, Alice and Bob can distil key. Because of this close relation between key distillation and QKD, many of the results we give here will have direct implications to QKD.
Furthermore, the theory of key distillation has nice parallels with the theory of entanglement distillation, where the goal is to distil maximally entangled states (also called singlets) from (a sequence of) bipartite quantum states. In fact, the two scenarios have many properties in common. For example, there is a gap between the key rate (i.e., the amount of key that can be distilled from some given noisy data) and the key cost (the amount of key that is needed to simulate the noisy data, using only public classical communication) [7] . This gap can be seen as the classical analogue of a gap between distillable entanglement (the amount of singlets that can be distilled from a given bipartite quantum state) and entanglement cost (the amount of singlets needed to generate the state).
Related work
The first and basic instance of an information-theoretic key agreement scenario is Wyner's wiretap channel [8] . Here, Alice can send information via a noisy classical channel to Bob. Eve, the eavesdropper, has access to a degraded version of Bob's information. Wyner has calculated the rate at which key generation is possible if only Alice is allowed to send public classical messages to Bob. Wyner's work has later been generalised by Csiszár and Körner, relaxing the restrictions on the type of information given to Eve [3] . Based on these ideas, Maurer and Ahlswede and Csiszár have proposed an extended scenario where key is distilled from arbitrary correlated classical information (specified by a tripartite probability distribution) [2, 4] . In particular, Maurer has shown that two-way communication can lead to a strictly positive key rate even though the key rate in the one-way communication scenario might be zero [2] .
In parallel to this development quantum cryptography emerged: in 1984 Bennett and Brassard devised a QKD scheme in which quantum channels could be employed in order to generate a secure key without the need to put a restriction on the eavesdropper [5] . In 1991, Ekert discovered that quantum cryptographic schemes could be based on entanglement, that is, on quantum correlations that are strictly stronger than classical correlations [6] . Clearly, this is key distillation from quantum information.
The first to spot a relation between the classical and the quantum development were Gisin and Wolf; in analogy to bound entanglement in quantum information theory, they conjectured the existence of bound information, namely classical correlation that can only be created from key but from which no key can be distilled [9] . Their conjecture remains unsolved, but has stimulated the community in search for an answer.
To derive lower bounds on the key rate, we will make repeated use of results by Devetak and Winter, who derived a bound on the key rate if the tripartite quantum information consists of many identical and mutually independent pieces, and by Renner and König, who derived privacy amplification results which also hold if this independence condition is not satisfied [10, 11] .
Contributions
We initiate the study of a unified key distillation scenario, which includes key distillation from pre-shared classical and quantum data (Section 2). We then derive a variety of quantitative statements related to this scenario. These unify and extend results from both the quantum and classical world.
There are numerous upper bounds available in the specific scenarios and it is our aim to provide the bigger picture that will put order into this zoo by employing the concept of a secrecy monotone, i.e., a function that decreases under local operations and public communication (Section 3), as introduced in [12] . The upper bounds can then roughly be subdivided into two categories: (i) the ones based on classical key distillation [13] and (ii) the ones based on quantum communication or entanglement measures [14] .
The unified scenario that we develop does not stop at an evaluation of the key rate but lets us investigate intricate connections between the two extremes. We challenge the viewpoint of Gisin and Wolf who highlight the relation between key distillation from classical correlation and entanglement distillation from this very correlation embedded into quantum states [9] : we prove a theorem that relates key distillation from certain classical correlation and key (and not entanglement) distillation from their embedded versions (Section 4). This ties in with recent work which established that key distillation can be possible even from quantum states from which no entanglement can be distilled [15] .
A fruitful concept that permeates this work is the concept of locking of classical information in quantum states: let Alice choose an n-bit string x = x 1 . . . x n with uniform probability and let her either send the state |x 1 . . . |x n or the state H ⊗n |x 1 . . . |x n to Bob, where H is the Hadamard transformation. Not knowing if the string is sent in the computational basis or in the Hadamard basis, it turns out that the optimal measurement that Bob can do in order to maximise the mutual information between the measurement outcome y and Alice's string x is with respect to a randomly chosen basis, in which case he will obtain I(X; Y ) = n 2 . If, however, he has access to the single bit which determines the basis, he will have I(X; Y ) = n. A single bit can therefore unlock an arbitrary amount of information. This effect has been termed locking of classical information in quantum states or simply locking and was first described in [16] . In this paper, we will discuss various types of locking effects and highlight their significance for the design and security of QKD protocols (Section 5) .
Finally, we demonstrate that the amount of key that can be distilled from given pre-shared data strongly depends on whether Eve is assumed to store her information in a classical or in a quantum memory. This, again, has direct consequences for the analysis of protocols in quantum cryptography (Section 6).
For a more detailed explanation of the contributions of this paper, we refer to the introductory paragraphs of Sections 3-6.
The unified key distillation scenario
In classical information-theoretic cryptography one considers the problem of distilling key from correlated data specified by a tripartite probability distribution p ijk (p ijk ≥ 0, i,j,k p ijk = 1). Alice and Bob who wish to distil the key have access to i and j, respectively, whereas the eavesdropper Eve knows the value k (see, e.g., [17] ). Typically, it is assumed that many independently generated copies of the triples (i, j, k) are available 4 . The key rate or distillable key of a distribution p ijk is the rate at which key bits can be obtained per realisation of this distribution, if Alice and Bob are restricted to local operations and public but authentic classical communication.
Before we continue to introduce the quantum version of the key distillation scenario described above, let us quickly note that it will be convenient to regard probability distributions as classical states, that is, given probabilities p i , we consider ρ = d i=1 p i |i i|, where |i is an orthonormal basis of a d-dimensional Hilbert space; we will assume that d < ∞. In the sequel we will encounter not only classical or quantum states, but also states that are distributed over several systems which might be partly classical and partly quantum-mechanical. To make this explicit, we say that a bipartite state ρ AB is cq (classical-quantum) if it is of the form
for quantum states ρ i B and a probability distribution p i . This definition easily extends to three or more parties, for instance:
where p ij is a probability distribution and ρ ij E are arbitrary quantum states.
• the probability distribution p ijk corresponds to a ccc (classical-classical-classical) state ρ ABE = i,j,k p ijk |ijk ijk| ABE , where we use |ijk ABE as a short form for |i A ⊗|j B ⊗|k E (as above, the states |i A for different values of i, and likewise |j B and |k k , are normalised and mutually orthogonal).
We will be concerned with key distillation from arbitrary tripartite quantum states ρ ABE shared by Alice, Bob, and an adversary Eve, assisted by local quantum operations and public classical communication (LOPC) [10, 19, 15] . A local quantum operation on Bob's side is of the form
Public classical communication from Alice to Bob can be modelled by copying a local classical register, i.e., any state of the form
Similarly, one can define these operations with the roles of Alice and Bob interchanged.
The goal of a key distillation protocol is to transform copies of tripartite states ρ ABE into a state which is close to
for some arbitrary τ E . τ ℓ ABE (also denoted τ ℓ for short) corresponds to a perfect key of length ℓ, i.e., uniform randomness on an alphabet of size 2 ℓ shared by Alice and Bob and independent of Eve's system. We measure closeness of two states ρ and σ in terms of the trace norm ρ − σ := 1 2 Tr|ρ − σ|. The trace norm is the natural quantum analogue of the variational distance to which it reduces if ρ and σ are classical.
We will now give the formal definition of an LOPC protocol and of the key rate. 
where τ ℓn ABE are the ccq states defined by (2) . The key rate or distillable key of a state ρ ABE is defined as
The quantity K D obviously depends on the partition of the state given as argument into the three parts controlled by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. We thus indicate the assignment of subsystems by semicolons if needed. For instance, we write ρ AD;B;E if Alice holds an additional system D.
As shown in Appendix A, the maximisation in the definition of K D can be restricted to protocols whose communication complexity grows at most linearly in the number of copies of
The above security criterion is (strictly) weaker than the one proposed in [10] 5 , hence K D (ρ ABE ) evaluated on cqq states is lower bounded by an expression derived in [10] :
This expression can be seen as a quantum analogue of the well-known bound of Csiszár, Körner, and Maurer [3, 17] . Here I(A : B) ρ denotes the mutual information defined by I(A :
is the von Neumann entropy of system A (and similarly for B and E). For later reference we also define the conditional mutual information
Note also that the criterion for the quality of the distilled key used in Definition 2.2 implies that the key is both uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary's knowledge, just as in [11] . Previous works considered uniformity and security separately. Note that, even though weaker than certain alternative criteria such as the one of [10] , the security measure of Definition 2.2 is universally composable [11] .
In [20] , the question was posed whether the security condition also holds if the accessible information is used instead of the criterion considered here. Recently, it has been shown that this is not the case [21] . More precisely, an example of a family of states was exhibited such that Eve has exponentially small knowledge in terms of accessible information but constant knowledge in terms of the Holevo information. This implies that in this context, security definitions based on the accessible information are problematic. In particular, a key might be insecure even though the accessible information of an adversary on the key is exponentially small (in the key size).
Upper bounds for the key rate
In this section, we first derive sufficient conditions that a function has to satisfy in order to be an upper bound for the key rate (Section 3.1). We focus on functions that are secrecy monotones [12] , i.e., they are monotonically decreasing under LOPC operations. Our approach therefore parallels the situation in classical and quantum information theory where resource transformations are also bounded by monotonic functions; examples include the proofs of converses to coding theorems and entanglement measures (see, e.g., [14] ). As a corollary to our characterisation of secrecy monotones, we show how to turn entanglement monotones into secrecy monotones.
In a second part (Section 3.2), we provide a number of concrete secrecy monotones that satisfy the conditions mentioned above. They can be roughly divided into two parts: (i) functions derived from the intrinsic information and (ii) functions based on entanglement monotones. Finally, we will compare different secrecy monotones (Section 3.3) and study a few particular cases in more detail (Section 3.4).
Secrecy monotones
Theorem 3.1. Let M (ρ) be a function mapping tripartite quantum states ρ ≡ ρ ABE into the positive numbers such that the following holds:
Asymptotic continuity: for any states
ρ n , σ n on H n A ⊗H n B ⊗H n E , the condition ρ n −σ n → 0 implies 1 log rn M (ρ n ) − M (σ n ) → 0 where r n = dim(H n A ⊗ H n B ⊗ H n E ). 3. Normalisation: M (τ ℓ ) = ℓ .
Then the regularisation of the function M given by
Proof. Consider a key distillation protocol P that produces output states σ n such that σ n − τ ℓn → 0. We will show that M ∞ (ρ) ≥ R P . Let us assume without loss of generality that
where we have used the normalisation condition. As remarked in Definition 2.2 there is a constant c > 0 such that log r n ≤ cn and by definition of R P there exists a c ′ > 0 and n 0 such that for all
Taking the limsup on both sides of (7) gives M ∞ (ρ) ≥ lim sup n ℓn n = R P . Thus we have shown that M ∞ is an upper bound for the rate of an arbitrary protocol, so that it is an also upper bound for K D .
If we restrict our attention to the special case of key distillation from bipartite states ρ AB , we can immediately identify a well-known class of secrecy monotones, namely entanglement monotones. A convenient formulation is in this case not given by the distillation of states τ ℓ with help of LOPC operations, but rather by the distillation of states γ ℓ via local operations and classical communication (LOCC), where
(|00 + |11 ) [15, 22] . Note that measuring the state γ ℓ with respect to the computational bases on Alice and Bob's subsystems results in ℓ key bits.
Corollary 3.2. Let E(ρ) be a function mapping bipartite quantum states ρ ≡ ρ AB into the positive numbers such that the following holds:
Asymptotic continuity: for any states
ρ n , σ n on H n A ⊗ H n B , the condition ρ n − σ n → 0 implies 1 log rn E(ρ n ) − E(σ n ) → 0 where r n = dim(H n A ⊗ H n B ). 3. Normalisation: E(γ ℓ ) ≥ ℓ .
Then the regularisation of the function E given by
The analogue of this result in the realm of entanglement distillation has long been known: namely, every function E satisfying LOCC monotonicity, asymptotic continuity near maximally entangled states as well as normalisation on maximally entangled states (E(|ψ ψ|) = log d for |ψ = 1 √ d i |ii ) can be shown to provide an upper bound on distillable entanglement E D [23, 24] , that is, E ∞ (ρ) ≥ E D (ρ). Additionally, if E is subadditive, the same inequality holds with E ∞ replaced by E. Indeed this result can be seen as a corollary to Corollary 3.2 by restricting from distillation of states τ ℓ to distillation of |ψ ψ| ⊗ℓ and noting that |ψ ψ| ⊗ℓ is of the form τ ℓ with trivial A ′ B ′ . In the above corollary, we have identified asymptotic continuity on all states as well as normalisation on the states γ ℓ (rather than on singlets) as the crucial ingredients in order for an entanglement measure to bound distillable key from above. Note also that we require those additional conditions as, for instance, the logarithmic negativity as defined in [25] satisfies the weaker conditions, therefore being an upper bound on distillable entanglement, but fails to be an upper bound on distillable key.
We will now show how to turn this bound for bipartite states (or tripartite pure states) into one for arbitrary tripartite states. The recipe is simple: for a given state ρ ABE , consider a purification |ψ ψ| AA ′ BB ′ E where the purifying system is denoted by A ′ B ′ and is split between Alice and Bob. Clearly, for any splitting,
. This inequality combined with the previous corollary applied to |ψ ψ| AA ′ BB ′ E proves the following statement. 
where
If E is subadditive, the same inequality holds with E replacing E ∞ .
Examples of secrecy monotones
We will now introduce a number of secrecy monotones. We will only briefly comment on the relations between them. A more detailed analysis of how the different bounds on the key rate compare is given in Section 3.3.
Intrinsic information
The intrinsic information of a probability distribution p ijk is given by
where ρ ABE is the ccc state corresponding to p ijk . The infimum is taken over all channels from E to E ′ specified by a conditional probability distributions p l|m . ρ ABE ′ is the state obtained by applying the channel to E. This quantity has been defined by Maurer and Wolf and provides an upper bound on the key rate from classical correlations [13] . We can extend it in the following way to arbitrary tripartite quantum states ρ ABE .
Definition 3.4. The intrinsic information of a tripartite quantum state ρ ABE is given by
where the infimum is taken over all CPTP maps
This definition is compatible with the original definition since it reduces to (10) if the systems A, B and E are classical.
As shown in Appendix B, the intrinsic information satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.1 and, hence, is an upper bound on the key rate.
Theorem 3.5. The intrinsic information is an upper bound on distillable key
Let us note that this bound differs from the bound proposed in [26, 19] where instead of all quantum channels, arbitrary measurements were considered. Our present bound can be tighter, as it can take into account Eve's quantum memory.
In the case where ρ ABE is pure, this bound can be improved by a factor of two because I(A : B ↓ E) ρ = 2E sq (ρ AB ), where E sq is the squashed entanglement defined below and because squashed entanglement is an upper bound for the key rate.
Squashed entanglement Definition 3.6. Squashed entanglement is defined as
Squashed entanglement can be shown to be a LOCC monotone, additive [27] , and asymptotically continuous [28] . In [29, Proposition 4.19] it was shown to satisfy the normalisation condition and is therefore an upper bound on distillable key according to Corollary 3.2.
Theorem 3.7. Squashed entanglement is an upper bound on distillable key
, i.e., K D (ρ ABE ) ≤ E sq (ρ AA ′ BB ′ ) where ρ AA ′ BB ′ = Tr E |ψ ψ| AA ′ BB ′ E and ρ ABE = Tr A ′ B ′ |ψ ψ| AA ′ BB ′ E .
Reduced intrinsic information
There is another way in which we can find a bound on the key rate which is tighter than the intrinsic information. In [7] it was shown that the classical intrinsic information is E-lockable, i.e., it can increase sharply when a single bit is taken away from Eve. Since (classical) distillable key is not E-lockable, the bound that the intrinsic information provides cannot be tight. This was the motivation for defining the reduced intrinsic information by I(AB ↓↓ E) = inf I(AB ↓ EE ′ ) + S(E ′ ) where the infimum is taken over arbitrary classical values E ′ [7] . We now define the quantum extension of this function.
Definition 3.8. Let a = 1, 2. The reduced intrinsic information (with parameter a) is given by
where the infimum is taken over all extensions ρ ABEE ′ with a classical register E ′ if a = 1 and over arbitrary extensions ρ ABEE ′ if a = 2.
The parameter a reflects the different behaviour of the intrinsic information subject to loss of a single bit (qubit). The reduced intrinsic information is an upper bound on distillable key since
The first inequality corresponds to Corollary 5.2 below.
Theorem 3.9. The reduced intrinsic information is an upper bound on distillable key, i.e.,
ρ , for a = 1, 2.
Relative entropy of entanglement
The relative entropy of entanglement and its regularised version are well-known entanglement measures that serve as important tools in entanglement theory.
Definition 3.10. The relative entropy of entanglement is given by [30, 31] 
where S(ρ AB σ AB ) = Trρ AB [log ρ AB − log σ AB ] and the minimisation is taken over all separable
The relative entropy of entanglement was the first upper bound that has been provided for K D (|ψ ψ| ABE ) [15, 22] . We now extend this result to all tripartite quantum states ρ ABE .
Theorem 3.11. The relative entropy of entanglement is an upper bound on distillable key, i.e.,
It is a particular advantage of E R in its function as an upper bound that it is not lockable [32] .
Comparison of secrecy monotones

Pure versus mixed
For entangled states, bounds derived from entanglement measures are usually tighter than the intrinsic information and its reduced version. Consider for example the state ρ ABE = |ψ ψ| AB ⊗ ρ E where |ψ AB = 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ). Here we have
while
for a = 1, 2. In general, for tripartite pure states, squashed entanglement is a tighter bound on the key rate than the intrinsic information by at least a factor of two:
The locking effect
We will now give a concrete example which shows that there is a purification |ψ
Consider the distribution p ijkl defined by the following distribution for p ij and where k and l are uniquely determined by (i, j),
for all (i, j) with p ij > 0. We denote the corresponding cccc state by
Clearly K D (ρ A;B;EF ) = 0, as Eve can factorise Alice and Bob, by keeping k when l = 1 and forgetting it when l = 0. In the former case, when l = 0, then Alice and Bob have (i, j) = (2, 2), and when l = 1, then Alice and Bob have (i, j) = (3, 3). In the latter case, both Alice and Bob have at random 0 or 1 and they are not correlated. On the other hand, when Eve does not have access to l, then the key rate is equal to 1, i.e., K D (ρ A;B;E )=1. Indeed, it cannot be greater, as key cannot increase more than the entropy of the variable that was taken out from Eve. However one finds that the intrinsic information is equal to 3/2, i.e., I(A : B ↓ E) ρ = 3/2 [7] .
Let us consider the purification of the above state,
and
Thus when E and F are with Eve, the state ρ AA ′ ;B of Alice and Bob is a mixture of four states: |0 |22 , |0 |33 , |φ and |ψ . This state is separable state, hence E R (ρ AA ′ ;B ) = 0. Consider now the state ρ AA ′ F ;B where F is controlled by Alice instead of Eve. Measuring F makes the state separable and in [32] it was shown that measuring a single qubit cannot decrease the relative entropy of entanglement by more than 1, thus we obtain
By Theorem 3.11 we then have K D (ρ ABE ) ≤ 1, but indeed one can distil one bit of key from ρ ABE , therefore
In [7] the considered distribution was generalised to make the gap between intrinsic information and distillable key arbitrarily large. It is not difficult to see that E R is still bounded by one. This shows that the bound based on relative entropy of entanglement, though perhaps more complicated in use, can be significantly stronger than intrinsic information bound. We leave it open, whether or not the intrinsic information bound is weaker in general when compared to the relative entropy bound. This parallels the challenge to discover a relation between the relative entropy of entanglement and squashed entanglement. Here it has also been observed that squashed entanglement can exceed the relative entropy of entanglement by a large amount, due to a locking effect [33] .
Upper and lower bounds when
In this section we focus on states of the form ρ ABE = ρ AB ⊗ ρ E . Since distillable key cannot increase under Eve's operations, the form of the state ρ E is not important and we conclude that K D (ρ AB ⊗ρ E ) is a function of ρ AB only. If the state ρ AB is classical on system A, then it is known that distillable key is equal to the quantum mutual information, K D (ρ AB ⊗ ρ E ) = I(A : B) ρ [10] . Indeed, we know from Theorem 3.5 that the key rate can never exceed I(A : B) ρ . For separable quantum states ρ AB we were able to further improve this bound. The upper bounds are summarised in the following theorem, whose proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.12. For all states
with equality if ρ AB is classical on system A. If ρ AB is separable, i.e.,
where E = {p i , ρ 
(E) is the maximal mutual information that Alice and Bob can obtain about i using LOPC operations (see e.g. [34, 35]), whereas I acc (E) denotes the usual accessible information, i.e. maximal mutual information about i obtained by joint measurements.
We will now derive a general lower bound on the key rate in terms of the distillable common randomness. Definition 3.13. We say that an LOPC protocol P distills common randomness at rate R P if there exists a sequence {ℓ n } n∈N such that lim sup
where m n is the number of communicated bits. The distillable common randomness of a state ρ AB is defined as D R (ρ AB ) := sup P R P .
For some protocols the rate may be negative. However it is immediate that D R (ρ AB ) is nonnegative for all ρ AB . The following statement is a direct consequence of the results in [10, 11] . Theorem 3.14. For the states ρ ABE = ρ AB ⊗ ρ E the distillable key is an upper bound on the distillable common randomness, i.e., K D (ρ AB ⊗ ρ E ) ≥ D R (ρ AB ) for all ρ AB and ρ E .
Embedding classical into quantum states
The problem of distilling key from a classical tripartite distribution (i.e., ccc states) is closely related to the problem of distilling entanglement from a bipartite quantum state (where the environment takes the role of the adversary), as noted in [9, 7] . It thus seems natural to ask whether, in analogy to bound entangled quantum states (which have positive entanglement cost but zero distillable entanglement), there might be classical distributions with bound information. These are distributions with zero key rate but positive key cost, i.e., no key can be distilled from them, yet key is needed to generate them. The existence of such distributions, however, is still unproved. (There are, however, some partial positive answers, including an asymptotic result [7] as well as a result for scenarios involving more than three parties [36] .)
In [9, 7] , it has been suggested that the classical distribution obtained by measuring bound entangled quantum states might have bound information. Such hope, however, was put into question by the results of [15] , showing that there are quantum states with positive key rate but no distillable entanglement (i.e., they are bound entangled). However, the examples of states put forward in [15] have a rather special structure. It is thus still possible that distributions with bound information might be obtained by measuring appropriately chosen bound entangled states.
In the following, we consider a special embedding of classical distributions into quantum states as proposed in [9] . We then show how statements about key distillation starting from the original state and from the embedded state are related to each other. Let
be a ccc state defined relative to fixed orthonormal bases on the three subsystems (in the following called computational bases). We then consider theembedding ρ= |ψ ψ| of ρ ccc given by
Note that, if Alice and Bob measure ρin the computational basis, they end up with a state of the form
for some appropriately chosen |ψ ij . We call this state the ccq embedding of ρ ccc .
In a similar way as classical distributions can be translated to quantum states, classical protocols have a quantum analogue. To make this more precise, we consider a classical LOPC protocol P that Alice and Bob wish to apply to a ccc state ρ ccc as in (33) . Obviously, P can equivalently be applied to the corresponding ccq embedding ρ ccq as defined in (35) (because Alice and Bob's parts are the same in both cases). Because Eve might transform the information she has in the ccq case to the information she has in the ccc case by applying a local measurement, security of the key generated by P when applied to ρ ccq immediately implies security of the key generated by P when applied to ρ ccc . Note, however, that the opposite of this statement is generally not true.
In general, a classical protocol P can be subdivided into a sequence of steps of the following form:
1. generating local randomness 2. forgetting information (discarding local subsystems) 3. applying permutations 4. classical communication.
The coherent version of P, denoted P q , is defined as the protocol acting on astate where the above classical operations are replaced by the following quantum operations: Consider now a fixed ccc state ρ ccc of the form (33) and let P be a classical protocol acting on ρ ccc . It is easy to see that the following operations applied to theembedding ρof ρ ccc result in the same state: (i) measuring in the computational basis and then applying the classical protocol P; or (ii) applying the coherent protocol P q and then measuring the resulting state γ ℓ in the computational basis. This fact can be expressed by a commutative diagram.
Hence, if the coherent version P q of P acting on ρdistills secure key bits at rate R then so does the protocol P applied to the original ccc state ρ ccc . It is natural to ask whether there are cases for which the converse of this statement holds as well. This would mean that security of a classical protocol also implies security of its coherent version. In the following, we exhibit a class of distributions for which this is always true. The key rate of any such distribution is thus equal to the key rate of the corresponding embeddedstate.
Roughly speaking, the class of distributions we consider is characterised by the property that the information known to Eve is completely determined by the joint information held by Alice and Bob. (and followed by a measurement in the computational basis) .
Proof. The ccq embedding of ρ ccc is given by a state of the form
Since, by assumption, every pair (i, j) determines a unique k = k(i, j), |ψ ij ψ ij | E equals |k(i, j) k(i, j)| and, hence, ρ ccq is identical to the original ccc state ρ ccc . The assertion then follows from the fact that measurements in the computational basis applied to Alice and Bob's subsystems commute with the coherent version P q of P. 
Note that the above statements do not necessarily hold for general distributions. To see this, consider the state
Moreover, let ρ ccc be the ccc state obtained by measuring |ψ ψ| AA ′ ;B;E in the computational basis. Because all its coefficient are positive, it is easy to verify that |ψ ψ| ABA ′ E can be seen as theembedding of ρ ccc . Observe that, after discarding subsystem A ′ , ρ ccc corresponds to a perfect key bit. However, the ccq state obtained from |ψ ψ| ABA ′ E by discarding A ′ and measuring in the computational basis is of the form 1 2 (|00 00| AB ⊗ |+ +| E + |11 11| AB ⊗ I E /2). This state, of course, does not correspond to a key bit as Eve might easily distinguish the states |+ +| and I E /2.
We continue with a statement on the relation between the intrinsic information of a ccc state and the so-called entanglement of formation 6 E F of itsembedding. More precisely, we show that, under the same condition as in Theorem 4.1, the first is a lower bound for the latter (see also [38, 39] ). 
Proof. Note first that any decomposition of Tr E (ρ) into pure states can be induced by an appropriate measurement on the system E. Hence, we have
where the minimum ranges over all families of (not necessarily normalised) vectors |k such that k |k k | = I E (this ensures that they form a measurement), pk := | k | E |ψ ABE | 2 , and |ψk := k | E |ψ ABE / √ pk. 6 The entanglement of formation E F is an entanglement measure defined for bipartite states by E F (σ AB ) := min P i p i S(Tr B (σ i AB )) where the minimum is taken over all ensembles {p i , σ i AB } with
For any pair (i, j) of values held by Alice and Bob (with nonzero probability) we have Tr AB [ρ(|ij ij| ⊗ I E )] = p ij |k k|, where k = k(i, j) is the corresponding (unique) value held by Eve. Hence, the probability distribution of the stateρ ccc obtained by applying the above measurement on Eve's system satisfies
where qk |k := Tr(|k k ||k k|). The intrinsic information is thus bounded by
whereρ ccc is the state defined above (depending on the choice of the vectors |k ). Moreover, using Holevo's bound, we find
The assertion then follows from (41) .
Because the intrinsic information is additive (i.e., it is equal to its regularised version), Theorem 4.3 also holds if the entanglement of formation E F is replaced by the entanglement cost E C .
The discussion above suggests that classical key distillation from ccc states can indeed by analysed by considering the correspondingembedding of the state, but the original ccc state has to satisfy certain properties. This relation might be particularly useful for the study of bound information as discussed at the beginning of this section. In fact, there exist bound entangled states which satisfy the property required by Theorem 4.1 above [40] .
On locking and pre-shared keys
In [7] it was observed that, by adding one bit of information to Eve, the (classical) intrinsic information can decrease by an arbitrarily large amount. In [16] it was shown that classical correlation measures of quantum states can exhibit a similar behaviour; more precisely, the accessible information can drop by an arbitrarily large amount when a single bit of information is lost. This phenomenon has been named locking of information or just locking. For tripartite states ρ ABE , locking comes in two flavours: i) locking caused by removing information from Eve, ii) locking caused by removing information from Alice and/or Bob (and possibly giving it to Eve). Let us call those variants E-locking and AB-locking, respectively.
In [32] it was shown that entanglement cost as well as many other entanglement measures can be AB-locked. Further results show that squashed entanglement and entanglement of purification are also AB-lockable [33, 41] . So far the only known non-lockable entanglement measure is relative entropy of entanglement.
It was shown in [7] that distillable key is not E-lockable for classical states. In the sequel we extend this result and prove that the distillable key for quantum states ρ ABE is not E-lockable, either. The proof proceeds along the lines of [7] , replacing the bound of Csiszár and Körner by its quantum generalisations due to [10] (see also [11] ). Let us emphasise that we leave open the question on whether distillable key is AB-lockable (even for ccc states).
Theorem 5.1. Consider a state ρ ABEE ′ and let P be a key distillation protocol for ρ ABE with rate R P . Then there exists another protocol P ′ for ρ ABEE ′ with rate
Proof. For any fixed ǫ > 0 there exists n ∈ N such that the protocol P transforms ρ ⊗n ABE into a ccq state σ ABE which satisfies the following inequalities:
Suppose that Alice and Bob apply this map to the state ρ ⊗n ABEE ′ (i.e., they try to distil key, as if the system E ′ was not present). The state ρ ⊗n ABEE ′ is then transformed into some state σ ABEE ′ which traced out over E ′ is equal to the ccq state σ ABE . Repeating this protocol m times results in σ ⊗m ABEE ′ , from which Alice and Bob can draw at least m(I(A : B) − I(A : EE ′ )) − o(m) bits of key by error correction and privacy amplification [10] . This defines a protocol P ′ . To evaluate its rate, we use subadditivity of entropy which gives the estimate
From (45) and the conditional version of Fannes' inequality [28] we know that, for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1],
This together with (6) implies
To get the key rate of P ′ , we divide the above by n and use (45),
Because this holds for any ǫ > 0, the assertion follows from I(AE :
Applying the above theorem to an optimal protocol leads to the statement that the key rate K D is not E-lockable.
Consider now a situation where Alice and Bob have some pre-shared key U which is not known to Eve.
A major consequence of Theorem 5.1 is that a pre-shared key cannot be used as a catalyst to increase the key rate. More precisely, the corollary below implies that, for any protocol P that uses a pre-shared key held by Alice and Bob, there is another protocol P ′ which is as efficient as P ′ (with respect to the net key rate), but does not need a pre-shared key.
Corollary 5.3. Let P be a key distillation protocol for ρ ABE ⊗ τ ℓ where τ ℓ is some additional ℓ-bit key shared by Alice and Bob. Then there exists another protocol P ′ for ρ ABE with rate
Proof. Consider the state ρ A ′ B ′ EE ′ where E ′ is a system containing the value U of a uniformly distributed ℓ-bit key, A ′ := (A, U ), and B ′ := (B, U ). Note that ρ A ′ B ′ E is equivalent to ρ ABE ⊗τ ℓ . The assertion then follows from the observation that any protocol which produces a secure key starting from ρ A ′ B ′ EE ′ can easily be transformed into an (equally efficient) protocol which starts from ρ ABE , because Alice and Bob can always generate public shared randomness.
The following example shows that the factor 2 in Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.2 is strictly necessary. Let
where |ψ i are the four Bell states on the bipartite system EE ′ . Then, obviously, K D (ρ ABEE ′ ) = 0, but if E ′ (which is only one qubit) is lost, then K D (ρ ABE ) = 2, since E is then maximally mixed conditioned on i. One recognises here the effect of superdense coding.
Classical and quantum adversaries in QKD
Up to now, we have considered an adversary with unbounded resources. Of course, if one limits the adversary's capabilities, certain cryptographic tasks might become easier. In the following, we will examine a situation where the adversary cannot store quantum states and, hence, is forced to apply a measurement, turning them into classical data. We will exhibit an example of a 2d-dimensional ccq state which only has key rate 1, but if Eve is forced to measure her system, the key rate raises up to roughly 1 2 log d. Note that upper bounds on the key rate which are defined in terms of an optimal measurement on Eve's system (see, e.g., [26, 19] and Section 3) are also upper bounds on the key rate in a setting where Eve has no quantum memory. Hence, our result implies that these upper bounds are generally only rough estimates for the key rate in the unbounded scenario.
Consider the state
where U is the quantum Fourier transform on d dimensions. (Such a state has been proposed in [16] to exhibit a locking effect of the accessible information. It also corresponds to the flower state of [32] .) It is easy to see that the bit in the system AB is uncorrelated to Eve's information and, hence, completely secret, i.e.,
On the other hand, if this bit is known to Eve then she has full knowledge on the state in
, where E ′ is a classical system carrying the value of the bit in AB (see Theorem 3.5). From this and Corollary 5.2 (or, alternatively, Theorem 3.9), we conclude that the key rate (relative to an unbounded adversary) is given by
Let us now assume that Eve applies a measurement on her system E, transforming the state defined above into a ccc state σ AA ′ BB ′ E . Because the values of Alice and Bob are maximally correlated, it is easy to see that the key rate of this state satisfies
Note that S(A) σ = 1 + log d. Moreover, the mutual information I(A : E) σ for an optimal measurement on E corresponds to the so-called accessible information, which equals 1 2 log d, as shown in [16] . We thus conclude that
Note that the accessible information is additive, so even if the measurements are applied to blocks of states, the amount of key that can be generated is given by this expression.
The above result gives some insights into the strength of attacks considered in the context of quantum key distribution (QKD). A so-called individual attack corresponds to a situation where the adversary transforms his information into classical values. In contrast, a collective attack is more general and allows the storage of quantum states.
As shown in [18] , for most QKD protocols, security against collective attacks implies security against any attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. The above result implies that the same is not true for individual attacks, i.e., these might be arbitrarily weaker than collective (and, hence, also general) attacks.
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A On the definition of the key rate
The following lemma achieves a simplification of the definition of distillable key K D (Definition 2.2). Proof. Let {Λ n } n∈N be a key distillation protocol with rate R and with communication not necessarily linear in n. Fix ǫ > 0. Then there exists an n 0 such that
and ℓn 0 n0 ≥ R − ǫ. Consider now key distillation from many copies of σ ABE := Γ(Λ n0 (ρ ⊗n0 ABE )), where Γ is a measurement of Alice and Bob in their computational bases. We can limit the dimension of Alice's and Bob's system to 2 ℓn 0 , because any additionally appearing symbols could be mapped, for instance, to the symbol 1. This allows us to bound the difference in the mutual informations with help of a conditional version of Fannes' inequality [28] ,
which holds if ǫ ≤ 1. Alice and Bob can achieve the rate I(A : B) σ − I(A : E) σ using communication linear in the number of copies of σ ABE , since σ ABE is evidently a ccq state [10, 11] . We have therefore modified the protocol {Λ n } n∈N achieving a rate R into a protocol {Λ n } n∈N with a rateR
The amount of communication in this protocol is proportional to the number of copies of ρ ABE .
Since ǫ was arbitrary we obtain a sequence of protocols (each with communication linear in the number of copies ρ AB ) which approaches the rate R.
B Proof of Theorem 3.5
To show that the intrinsic information is an upper bound on the key rate, it suffices to verify that it satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3. 
which is equivalent to
since C ′ and C ′′ are copies of C. Eliminating the term S(ACE ′ ) we see that the claim is true by strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy.
Since the statement holds for arbitrary channels, it also holds for the intrinsic information.
Asymptotic continuity. Let ||ρ ABE − σ ABE || 1 ≤ ǫ. Since the trace distance is non-increasing under CPTP maps we find ||ρ ABE ′ − σ ABE ′ || 1 ≤ ǫ, where ρ ABE ′ = (I AB ⊗ Λ E→Ē )(ρ ABE ) and σ ABE ′ = (I AB ⊗ Λ E→Ē )(σ ABE ). By the conditional version of Fannes' inequality we find
Normalisation. This property can be verified by inserting τ ABE into the definition of the intrinsic information.
Subadditivity. We first prove additivity on tensor products for the mutual information: 
where the last inequality follows by the independence of ρ A1B1E ′ 1 and ρ A2B2E ′
2
. Subadditivity for the intrinsic information follows from the observation that the infimum in the definition includes product channels.
C Proof of Theorem 3.12
The statement K D (ρ AB ⊗ ρ E ) ≤ I(A : B) follows from the intrinsic information bound. The equality condition is a consequence of (6) .
To prove the second part of the theorem, we view ρ AB as the partial state of a tripartite state
where D is a classical register. Consider a key distillation protocol for the state ρ AB with rate R. For the map on n copies of the state, let C be the overall communication and let A ′ and B ′ denote the classical keys generated by Alice and Bob, respectively. The definition of the key rate implies that I(A ′ : B ′ |C)/n converges to R. It is our goal to find an upper bound for I(A ′ : B ′ |C). 
The r.h.s. is a lower bound for the LOPC-accessible information of n copies of the ensemble E. However LOPC-accessible information is additive if its members are separable [42] . Thus we obtain I LOPC acc
Of course I acc is by definition not smaller than I
LOPC acc
. This concludes the proof since the above for any protocol.
